As Professor Clay Calvert has recognized, one of the problems with using metaphors to describe online activities is that the metaphor can replace the reality and thus "frame our thinking too narrowly." 13 Thus, although it may be colorful, it is not analytically useful to think of the Internet as a transportation vehicle in which one makes "virtual" voyages. 4 To the contrary, the Internet is an earthbound network of interconnected computers, each with a specific physical location, connected by a physical telecommunications backbone. One no more makes a "virtual visit" when using the Internet than when telephoning long distance.
Equally fanciful is the concept of the Internet as its own, ethereal jurisdiction. "Cyberspace," after all, is not a real place, but a term coined in a science fiction novel. 5 For all of its unique attributes, it "exists" as a separate jurisdiction only in the sense that Never-Never Land does. 6 Rather than debate which of several competing metaphors may be appropriate to describe online activities, it is more appropriate to step back and inquire, in a media-neutral manner, whether the particular activity under review takes on a different complexion when it occurs over the Internet as opposed to other contexts. By eschewing all labels, one avoids having to choose among them. By focusing on the underlying activity, one reduces the risk of being trapped in a confining analogy. By frankly assessing the conduct at issue, without undue regard for the medium through which it is conducted, one gets to the heart of the policy concerns that led to the creation of the applicable legal rule.
Internet gambling offers an excellent test case for this approach because, although the Internet may change the mechanics of gambling by a considerable degree, it does not change the nature of gambling itself. Moreover, the differences in mechanics, which stem from the pervasive and instantaneous nature of this medium, only compound the problems generally associated with gambling. As Professor I. Trotter Hardy has noted, notwithstanding the unique nature of some acts in cyberspace, the Internet presents no new legal issues when it is being used "simply [as] a medium of same individual can become a pamphleteer."); American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (raising questions of whether "the Internet is more like a television? a radio? a newspaper? a 900-line? a village green?").
13. Calvert, supra note 11, at 565. 14. See Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (expressly rejecting the contention that permitting U.S. residents to access the adult web site "Playmen," based in Italy, was the equivalent of flying to Italy to purchase a copy of Playmen magazine). 117, 124 (1997) ( arguing that "it is hard to maintain that the Net is some kind of free city in the sky").
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direct communication between people-much like the telephone, mail or fax." ' 7 Internet gambling readily falls into that category. For the purposes of federal antigambling laws, it is the 1990s equivalent of using the telephone to play the numbers or place bets. It is a type of online activity whose medium does not affect the legal consequences. Moreover, it illustrates why certain laws, both criminal and civil, are properly applied in a media-neutral fashion.
Most articles on Internet gambling disagree, but fall to identify what it is about long-distance gambling online that distinguishes it from longdistance gambling via the mail or telephone and makes it incapable of regulation. Most focus almost exclusively on jurisdictional issues or perceived enforcement problems, leading them to conclude that applying United States laws to prevent online gambling operators from transacting business with U.S. citizens is at least unwise, if not impossible." 8 This Essay disagrees. Troubling policy issues lurk in the assumption that gambling in cyberspace, along with countless other Internet issues, requires a new legal regime. These issues are broader than the problems associated with the proliferation of gambling. First, accepting these 184-85 (1996) (asserting that "the nature of the Internet renders isolated United States' laws unenforceable to a large extent' and that legislators should collaborate with foreign governments to establish a uniform policy that facilitates self-regulation).
arguments requires a departure from existing case law upholding over one hundred years of congressional efforts that respond to developments in communications technology when they threaten the federal regulatory approach to interstate and international gambling. 9 Second, a "hands off' approach sends the wrong message to courts that otherwise must grapple, and by and large have done so successfully, with new issues created by the Internet and other digital technologies. 2°T hird, and perhaps most disturbing, waiting for the development of a new legal regime capable of resolving "all issues Internet" would require turning a blind eye to the immediate and pervasive nature of the nonInternet contacts these so-called "offshore" sites have with the United States. Some sense of these contacts can be gained from reviewing the complaints filed in the series of precedent-setting prosecutions commenced in March 1998 against twenty-one Internet sports gambling sites. 21 In a direct challenge to Internet gambling operators' contentions that they avoid violating federal antigambling laws by locating their operations offshore, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York has alleged that these Web sites violate the Wire Wager Act. 22 The allegations detail the ubiquitous nature of the contacts those purportedly offshore operations have with U.S. citizens and how similar these transactions are to gambling transactions previously conducted by mail and telephone.
Finally, measured against brick-and-mortar casinos, Internet gambling has a greater potential to exacerbate the abuses associated with addictive or underage gambling and appears to pose a much higher risk to society. The anonymity and ubiquity of Internet gambling, coupled with its reliance on credit cards to foster long-distance betting, increases these risks, particularly given that video gambling devices have been characterized 19 . See infra notes 76-104 and accompanying text. 20. Many courts have successfully applied existing legal doctrine to Intemet-related disputes. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324-26 (9th Cir. 1998) (ruling that defendants' intent to sell an Internet domain name constitutes a "commercial use" for the purposes of the federal Trademark Dilution Act); Tasini v. New York Times, 972 F. Supp. 804, 818-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying the concept of "media-neutrality" to conclude that a copyright holder's right to publish a "revision" of collective works includes digital, on-line revisions, even if the digital nature of the medium resulted in differences from the original print publications); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (declining to adopt a purely literal approach to the Copyright Act and concluding that an online service provider was not contributorily or vicariously liable for users' posting of copyrighted material, if the provider had no actual knowledge of infringing acts). I previously have commented on the importance of creative uses of common and statutory law to resolve technology disputes given the time it takes to achieve more comprehensive legislative solutions. See Bruce P. In short, there are powerful policy and process reasons why it makes sense to prosecute those who entice and enable U.S. citizens to gamble online. Even after giving due deference to the nearly unanimous line of contrary commentary, this Essay concludes: (1) there is nothing unique about Internet gambling that should lead the federal government to abandon its traditional protective role in this area; 24 and (2) there is no reason why existing gambling laws cannot be applied online as successfully as other laws have been.
Part II of this Essay gives a brief overview of U.S. gambling laws, including the role of federal law in maintaining the integrity of each state's approach to gambling. It focuses on the Wire Wager Act, which has become the federal government's main weapon against Internet gambling. Part III details various failed attempts to challenge federal antigambling laws, leading to Part IV, which describes the recent prosecutions of Internet gambling site operators under the Wire Wager Act. Part V analyzes the societal concerns that necessitate regulation of Internet gambling and discusses why the appropriate application of federal law avoids both constitutional and practical concerns. Finally, Part VI concludes by emphasizing how laws governing real space can be applied successfully to cyberspace in a media-neutral way. 23 . Kyl Bill Hearing, supra note 5, at I I (statement of James E. Doyle, Att'y Gen., State of Wis.). Largely because of the dangers that Internet gambling poses to minors and problem gamblers, the National Gambling Impact Study Commission is expected to "seek a broad ban on online gambling when it issues its report in June [19991 Commission's Regulation, Enforcement, and Internet Subcommittee "was prompted by state concerns that the federal government should take the lead in regulating Internet gambling").
I. AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. GAMBLING LAWS

A. State Laws
Gambling legislation is largely a matter of state law and, as a result, varies considerably, running from prohibition to regulation to taxation to the even more remunerative scheme of outright cooption, most notably in the form of state-run lotteries.' Utah, for example, allows its citizens no access to gambling-hosting even a private poker game is outlawed. 26 Conversely, Nevada, Utah's next door neighbor, is well-known for taking quite a different approach. ' Private lotteries-a form of gambling traditionally defined as games in which people pay consideration for the opportunity to win a prize based on chance rather than skil1 2 8 -are unlawful in every state. 29 Filling the void, however, are the thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia that run their own lotteries, on which people bet thirty-five billion dollars per year. 3 " Similarly, although most states prohibit private off-track betting on horse and dog races, a number run their own off-track betting parlors, where total bets exceed over two billion dollars annually. Seven states allow off-track bets to be placed by phone." 25 In recent years, the prospects of gambling as a taxable revenue source, directly or in the form of increased tourism revenues, has proven irresistible to many states. The number of states that permit, regulate, and tax casino or riverboat gambling grew from just two in 1988-Nevada and New Jerseyto twenty-five today. 32 Today, every state except Utah and Hawai'i has legalized some form of gambling. 3 " It is therefore hardly surprising that, in 1996, legal wagering of all kinds in the United States totaled over $550 billion. 4 In an effort to ensure that some of the social ills linked to gambling are not fostered by these state authorized operations, a number of states specifically require that information about and help for compulsive gambling be published in conjunction with information about state-run lotteries and at state-run gambling sites. 35 Others allocate a percentage of lottery revenues to Gamblers Anonymous and other treatments for problem gamblers. 36 
B. Federal Laws
The historical federal response to gambling recognizes that this hodgepodge approach has created wide variations among even neighboring states. As a result, Congress consistently has acted to ensure that neither interstate nor foreign commerce is used to circumvent whatever choices have been made at the state level. 37 The congressional role has been to prevent interstate commerce from being used to breach the walls states have erected to regulate gambling within their borders. In 1827, Congress began by targeting the federal government's then most ubiquitous representatives in interstate commerce: postmasters. It prohibited any postmaster from acting "as agent for lottery offices." 41 A few years later, concerned that even if individual postmasters were not assisting in the promotion of gambling, the mails certainly could be used for that purpose, Congress expanded the prohibition to outlaw any use of the U.S. mail to promote "lotteries... or other similar enterprises offering prizes of any kind... . 42 In the 1890s, when lotteries attempted to circumvent the mailing ban by advertising in newspapers, Congress responded by outlawing the mailing of any newspapers that carried such advertising' and by prohibiting the transportation of lottery tickets in interstate commerce. 4 Faced with the communications revolution spawned by radio broadcasting, Congress in 1934 criminalized broadcast advertising containing information about commercial lotteries. 45 The language of this The Interstate Wagering Amendment was not the first time Congress elected to supplement individual states' approaches to gambling by outlawing interstate transmissions of "information" pertaining to gambling. 5 It previously did so in the Wire Wager Act, 6 one of several anti-racketeering laws passed in the 1960s to combat organized crime. 7 It is the breadth of the Wire Wager Act that has attracted the most attention in the Internet gambling context because, notwithstanding the potential applicability of other federal laws, 58 it directly prohibits the use of a wire transmission facility to foster a gambling business. It provides, in relevant part:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or § 1953 (1994) , which rendered unlawful the introduction into interstate commerce of "any record, paraphernalia, ticket, certificate, bills, slip, token, paper, writing or other device used, or to be used" in gambling; and 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994), which prohibited owning or operating an illegal gambling business, which is defined as a gambling business that violates state law, involves five or more persons and either is in substantially continuous operation for more than 30 days or has a gross revenue of more than $2000 in any single day.
58. Internet gambling sites, as currently operated, appear to violate several of the provisions of these acts. wagers, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 59 This language, on its face, is broad enough to cover Internet gambling, which, given today's technology, necessarily involves the use of a "wire communication facility" '6 for "the transmission" of "bets or wagers" or information that assists the "placing of bets or wagers."
Particularly significant for the application of § 1084(a) to Internet gambling is that it does not simply outlaw the placing or taking of bets or wagers, as, for example, many state laws do. Instead, it focuses on the knowing "use" of a wire communication facility in connection with a gambling business. 61 Properly analyzed, this should marginalize disputes over whether a transmission in violation of the Act requires the placing or receiving of bets. The Act underscores this point by prohibiting not only the act of gambling, but also transmissions of any information that make it possible to bet in the first place.
Furthermore, § 1084 prohibits the interstate transmission of bets or gambling information irrespective of whether the ultimate bet violates the law of the state where the gambling takes place. This contrasts, for instance, with § 1955, which criminalizes gambling businesses only to the extent that they violate state law. 62 Similarly, § 1084 prevents the interstate transmission of information that would assist gambling, such as the transmission of basketball results from Indiana to Nevada, other than in the context of news reporting. Section 1084(b) also allows the transmission-of information only, not bets-from a state where betting on the event is legal to another state where such betting is also legal. 63 The House Report on § 1084 emphasizes that "[n]othing in the exemption, however, will permit the transmission of bets and wagers or money by wire as a result of a bet or 
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wager from or to any State whether betting is legal in that state or not." ' Therefore, in the online gambling context, the literal language of § 1084 condemns all Internet transmissions to the United States of the digitized bits of information that create the virtual gambling site on a user's computer screen.
5
Two interpretation issues, however, do exist. First, the words "wire communication facility" arguably could fail to cover wireless transmissions. At present, however, there are no entirely wireless ways to use the Internet. 66 Second, the specific prohibition in § 1084 on the transmission of "information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting 64. H.R. REP. No. 87-967, at 3 (1961). As the report continues:
[p]hrased differently, the transmission of gambling information on a horserace from a State where betting on that horserace is legal to a state where betting on the same horserace is legal is not within the prohibitions of the bill. Since Nevada is the only State which has legalized offtrack betting, this exemption will only be applicable to it.
Id.
65. The question of whether an unlawful transmission has occurred has, in other contexts, led courts to focus on whether bets were placed or received. See United States v. Tomeo, 459 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1972) (summarizing cases reflecting a split in authority); United States v. Reeder, 614 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1980) (concluding that the "prevailing view" is that § 1084(a) covers the use of wire communications facilities by those in the gambling business, whether sending, receiving, or both is involved). To avoid the application of § 1084(a), an offshore cybercasino would have to argue that its server does not use the Internet to transmit anything at all, an argument that is contrary to common sense and established case law. In Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) , "the contention of Defendants [was] that WagerNet has transmitted nothing over the Internet and that the only person in this case who would transmit anything would be Minnesota residents who contact Wager Net." Id. at *8. The court properly found this proposition absurd:
[W]hen the Minnesota user plugs in the URL address for Vegas.Com, if Vegas.Com did not send an electronic transmission back to the computer user, the computer user would see nothing. He or she would see a blank screen. The way that the pictures and words get to the Minnesota residents is by the server, Vegas.com, automatically transmitting it back to the Minnesota resident....
[O]ne who sets up his or her system and knows that anyone accessing his or her site will get that information, then the server ought to be held responsible for that information. Moreover, the legislative history of the Act makes clear that Congress intended to exclude wireless communication only for fear of treading on the rights of broadcasters. The only kinds of wireless communication specifically excluded are radio and television broadcasts:
There is nothing in this bill which would in any way affect the press, radio or TV in its reporting of sporting events. In fact, wireless communication was not included in this bill because it is our belief that the Federal Communications Commission has ample authority to control the misuse of this means of communication.
S. REP. No. 87-588, at 3 (1961).
event or contest" ' 6 7 has led some to suggest that § 1084 covers bets or wagers only on events or contests that involve sports. Given that the Act also prohibits, without modification, "the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers" 6 and "information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers," 69 this would seem to be a strained interpretation. Additionally, the House and Senate Reports on the Act consistently refer generally to "bets and wagers" without limiting them to sports bets. 70 The singling-out of information relating to "any sporting event or contest" reflects the popularity, at the time the Act was passed, of sports betting via telephone. 7 There also have been, however, several indictments under the Act for numbers games carried on by telephone. 7 2 To conclude that § 1084 is limited to sports betting, one has to accept the argument that Congress intended to carve the numbers racket out from its reach. This would be an unlikely conclusion, given the nexus between that form of gambling and organized crime. 73 In light of this, the Kyl bill, 74 which was introduced in the 105th Congress to regulate Internet gambling, is, at least in part, superfluous. One of its purposes was to clarify that the Wire Wager Act covers all forms of telecommunications used to transmit all types of gambling information, including, but not limited to, information about sporting events. Another purpose was to denominate "the Internet or any other interactive computer service" as included within the channels of communication in which gambling is forbidden. 7 5 Such clarification seems unnecessary in light of § 79 The Supreme Court recently reviewed the history of congressional antigambling legislation and challenges to it in United States v. Edge Broadcasting." The statute at issue in Edge was 18 U.S.C. § 1304, which prohibits radio and television stations from broadcasting lottery advertising unless they are licensed in the state that runs the lottery being advertised." It did not, therefore, involve facts that bear directly on the issue of Internet gambling. Edge nevertheless set the stage for the conclusion that 18 U.S.C.
§ 1084 is lawfully applied to Internet gambling prosecutions in at least two ways. First, the Court began its analysis by emphasizing the breadth of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, 82 using as an example the Louisiana Lottery, with which Congress seemed particularly concerned in the 1890s. 83 It noted that when the Louisiana Lottery moved its operations 88 on which the Lottery Case relied extensively. Pensacola held unconstitutional Florida's attempt to grant a local company a monopoly over the Internet's turn-of-the-century equivalent: the telegraph. Quoting extensively from the Pensacola Court's opinion, the Lottery Case decision emphasized that Commerce Clause powers "'are not confined to the instrumentalities of commerce ... known or in use when the Constitution was adopted, but.., keep pace with the progress of the country, and adapt themselves to the new developments of time and circumstances."'" 89 self-defense, because "many millions of dollars have been withdrawn from and lost to this State by the sale of Havana, Kentucky, and Madrid and other lottery tickets, thereby impoverishing our own people." Spofford, supra note 29, at 190 (quoting an anonymous source). In return, the Lottery paid $40,000 per year to the state treasury out of profits that approached one million dollars annually. When, in 1879, the legislature repealed its grant, the Lottery successfully lobbied a state constitutional convention for reinstatement. In 1890, faced again with extinction, the Lottery promised the legislature $1.25 million annually for a 25-year franchise extension. This proposal was vetoed by the governor. See id. at 190-92. After long judicial proceedings, the Lottery moved to Honduras, leading Congress, in 1895, to add "foreign" to the type of commerce in which lottery ticket trafficking was illegal. See Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 422. The Louisiana Lottery's unsavory character, its ubiquity, and its resistance to attempts to kill it earned it the nickname "Serpent" and condemnation as "this hydra-headed monster, which is demoralizing the young, the poor, and the needy throughout the country, as no institution in America has ever Then, in words directly applicable to the Internet, the Court focused on the commercial importance of the telegraph, describing it as "'an epoch in the progress of time. In a little more than a quarter of a century it has changed the habits of business and, become one of the necessities of commerce. It is indispensable as a means of intercommunication, but especially is it so in commercial transactions."' 90 The Pensacola approach to Commerce Clause authority makes it abundantly clear that Internet communications in the late twentieth century, including those with foreign implications, should be within the scope of the Commerce Clause.
More recent challenges to federal gambling legislation have arisen in the context of criminal prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1084, as well as its companion legislation from the 1960s. Two such § 1084 prosecutions, in particular, shed light on the applicability of § 1084 to online gambling.
In Martin v. United States, 91 the appellants were convicted for transmitting bets and betting information about football games by telephone from Houston to Las Vegas. 9 2 They challenged the constitutionality of § 1084 on the theory that their conviction for transmitting wagers to Las Vegas, where those bets were legal, resulted in an unconstitutional application of the statute "to defeat the policies of Nevada." 93 The Fifth Circuit rejected that defense, noting that Congress's power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit such communications was sufficiently broad to cover communications between states taking different approaches to gambling. The court, therefore, concluded that the interstate transmission of wagers could be proscribed whether or not betting is lawful in the state where the bet is received. 94 United States v. Blair 95 also is instructive. Blair illustrates that 18 U.S.C. § 1084 can be used to prosecute not only communications between different states, but also between the United States and offshore, gamblinglegal jurisdictions. Blair was convicted of violating § 1084 by accepting "wagers on professional and college basketball games from residents" of Oklahoma "over the phone via a toll-free number he had established" while he was located in the Dominican Republic. 96 Having entered a guilty plea, Blair argued on appeal that the district court should not have accepted the 99 the Court emphasized that at the time § 1084 and its companion antigambling legislation were enacted, Congress was well "aware of legal sweepstakes run by governments in other countries," " yet declined to enact sweeping exemptions for such activities. Instead, it explained, Congress took a more narrow approach, creating exemptions where it thought appropriate. Given the absence of any such exemption in the statute Fabrizio was accused of violating, 10 ' the Court concluded that even lawful state or foreign-based gambling operations properly were included within the scope of federal prohibitions."
The preceding line of authority undermines any argument that the Internet is so new and unique as to fall beyond the scope of Congress's authority to criminalize its use for certain acts. Internet gambling operators have not been bashful about promoting themselves as a purportedly legal way to circumvent traditional gambling restrictions. Those claims, however, clash with the broad reach of the federal antigambling authority and the number of times such legislation has withstood constitutional challenge. It was not surprising, therefore, that in the spring of 1998, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York announced the filing of criminal complaints against twenty-one offshore Internet-gambling operators under the Wire Wager Act. These prosecutions are the federal government's first effort to attack the proliferation of online gambling. 5 The complaints alleged that these offshore sports gambling sites, with names such as "Real Casino," "Galaxy Sports," and "Winner's Way," 1 06 had advertised in sports and airline in-flight magazines touting the ease and convenience of betting via the Internet and listing their Web site addresses. 7 Interestingly, although all the Web sites purportedly were operated in the Caribbean or Costa Rica under licenses issued by the host Caribbean operations through various means, including obtaining betting information via computer. See id. at 445. For whatever reason, however, the prosecution did not rely on 18 U.S.C. § 1084 as the foundation for a substantive charge. Instead, the defendants were indicted for conducting an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955. This statute requires proof that the operation violates the law of the state in which it is conducted. See Truesdale, 152 F.3d at 447. The government's case, however, contained no direct proof that any bets were accepted in Texas. See id. at 447. The Fifth Circuit ruled that it was "irrational to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that after having gone through the effort of fully equipping, staffing, and widely advertising the Caribbean offices, the appellant nevertheless illegally accepted bets" in Texas. Id. at 448. Without proof of this predicate offense, all of the remaining convictions were also reversed. country, the complaints indicate that several entities run by the defendants had offices in the United States.! 8 Other United States contacts included toll-free telephone numbers over which undercover FBI agents received gambling information"° and could place bets,' as well as wire transfers of money from the United States to offshore banks."' Additionally, some of the sites used the U.S. mails to send informational brochures to American customers. 112 There were further contacts via e-mail and wire transfers of refunds back to the United States." 3 All of these communications are alleged to have violated the prohibitions of § 1084.
In early March 1998, warrants were issued for the arrest of fourteen gambling operators, eleven of whom surrendered or were arrested." 4 A few weeks later, warrants were issued for the arrest of seven additional gambling operators." 5 All twenty-one were U.S. citizens. On April 9, 1998, Michael The weight of authority suggests that any defenses to these federal prosecutions predicated on the contention that gambling is legal in the jurisdiction where these operators place their servers ultimately should fail."
7 There is no precedent to support the suggestion that U.S. residents are "making a virtual visit to Antigua," or that Commerce Clause power cannot proscribe the placing of bets between New York and Antigua. The question then arises whether there are other sound constitutional or policy reasons for not prosecuting Internet gambling operators, either under the Wire Wager Act or related prohibitions. . Second, he argued, because the money was already in Antigua, the only thing being transmitted to Antigua via the Internet is "either the placing of a bet or the transmission of information" assisting in the placing of bets. Id. at 7. Third, he argued that the "placing of bets" is not illegal in New York, from which the undercover agents made their online bets. Id. at 6. As support for this proposition, he cited a New York case that criminalizes every aspect of gambling except the placing of the bets itself. See People v. Giordano, 663 N.E.2d 588, 591 (N.Y. 1995) ("Under the statutory scheme a mere 'player' or bettor is not criminally liable but one who, in some capacity other than as a player, participates in any gambling enterprise or activity is guilty of a crime."). Finally, he maintained that, because "placing a bet" is legal in New York, he could not be prosecuted for violating § 1084 because of the exception in § 1084(b) that permits "the transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State or foreign country where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State or foreign country in which such betting is legal." See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at 6-8.
Cohen's argument depends, at its core, on the underlying premise that by accessing remote Web sites, U.S. citizens make "virtual voyages" from their home states to transact business solely in the jurisdiction where the Web site server is located. As noted, this theory already has been rejected in other contexts. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting the premise that, by accessing a Web server located in Italy, the U.S. user "transport[s] himself to Italy"). Moreover, Cohen's argument misses the point. Regardless of whether the fractional act of "placing a bet" is legal in New York for the person placing the bet, which it does not appear to be, see N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-401 (McKinney 1989) (declaring "all wagers, bets or stakes ... unlawful"), the "betting" transaction clearly is illegal, as it necessarily involves more people than just the bettor, see Giordano, 663 N.E.2d at 591. Because § 1084(b) exempts only the transmission of betting information between states where the complete transaction of betting on sports events or contests is legal, and because such betting is not legal in New York, "information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers" that emanates from New York does not qualify for the exception under § 1084(b). On February 5, 1999, Chief Judge Thomas P. Griesa denied Cohen's motion to dismiss. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at 57.
See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying texL
A. The Societal Concerns Are Greater Online
The societal concerns" 8 that have led to the heavy regulation of brickand-mortar casinos and other forms of gambling do not evaporate online. In fact, because there is no strict governmental oversight of online gambling machinery and accounting procedures, the prospects for dishonest operations increase. Moreover, the anonymity of Internet gambling makes it easier to indulge in excessive gambling." 9 States that allow traditional casinos protect against these problems in a number of different ways: Internet gambling eludes these safeguards. Because offshore gambling operations are beyond the reach of both state gambling laws and state regulatory laws, there is no way for regulators to ensure fair games and aboveboard accounting practices. Online gamblers already have complained that, although their losses are deducted immediately from their online accounts, their winnings often fail to appear. 129 In most instances, the individual'gambler does not know, or have the resources to determine, who exactly the Internet "house" is, further reducing the guarantee of a fair payout.
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It also is easy to see how Internet gambling frustrates the state goals of preventing excessive gambling and gambling by addicts and minors. By enabling rampant advertising, it defeats advertising restrictions. By offering gambling in the home at any hour, it defies time and place restrictions.' By allowing gambling by credit card, it allows people to bet, not just to the limit of their wallet or bank account, but to their credit limit. 132 Additionally, Internet gambling operations have no way to screen out minors, drunks, or habituals, all of whom can easily bypass the primitive and pro forma safeguards that most sites have available. 133 This raises the prospect of awestruck teenage techno-junkies or their gambling-addicted parents pounding the keyboard at unpoliced Internet gambling sites twenty-four hours a day.M Furthermore, sports gambling, an extremely popular form of gambling on the Internet, has been shown to be the most potentially addicting form for adults and teenagers alike. 135 Some argue that the only way to stop problem gambling is to stop problem gamblers and to punish individual offenders instead of pursuing the casinos. The futility of doing so and the difficulty of tracking down individual cybergamblers have led some commentators to declare cybergambling laws unenforceable. 36 Traditional law enforcement, however, has never focused on the individual gambler. The Wire Wager Act, for instance, is not aimed at individuals but at those "engaged in the business of betting or wagering." 137 Furthermore, although some state laws forbid individuals to gamble or to transmit "information as to wagers" over the telephone, 3 8 such laws are seldom enforced.
1 39 The way to control online gambling is the same as the way government has controlled brickand-mortar gambling: at the source.
B. Federal Regulation and Prosecution Avoids Commerce Clause Concerns
A potentially significant threshold limitation on applying state laws to
Internet gambling is the so-called dormant Commerce Clause.1 40 Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence forbids individual states--even absent congressional action-from regulating within their borders commerce that is essentially national in character in such a way as to "burden" interstate 135 . "According to experts on problem gaming, access to illegal sports betting on the Internet dramatically increases the risk that people will become active, pathological gamblers. The National Council on Problem Gambling reports that sports betting is among the most popular forms of gambling for compulsive gambler [sic] in the United States." Kyl Bill Hearing, supra note 5, at 15 (statement of Jeff Pash, Executive Vice President, NFL).
136. See David Post, Gambling on Internet Laws, AM. LAW., Sept. 1998, at 95 (arguing that tracking individual gamblers "will prove ineffective because these detection mechanisms can so easily be evaded" by disabling the site-recording features of the gambler's hard drive, encrypting an alias, or accessing a remote computer as the "host" for a gambling session). commerce. The classic examples are the "mudguard" and "blowpost" cases that forbid Illinois from requiring interstate trucks to change their mudguards at its borders 14 1 and Georgia from forcing interstate trains to stop and blow their whistles at all 124 grade crossings between South Carolina and Florida. 142 These familiar examples were updated in the digital era by American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 4 3 in which a federal district court in New York struck down that state's Internet Indecency Act, 1 " which forbade the use of the Internet "to initiate or engage in [sexually explicit] communication with a person who is a minor." 145 Determining that the resolution of the case "depends on the appropriate analogy," the court found "that the Internet is analogous to a highway or railroad," making "the phrase 'information superhighway' ... more than a mere buzzword; it has legal significance, because the similarity between the Internet and more traditional instruments of interstate commerce leads to analysis under the Commerce Clause." 146 The court concluded that subjecting Web pages to the vagaries of state law "highlights the likelihood that a single actor might be subject to haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent regulation by states that the actor never intended to reach and possibly was unaware were being accessed." 147 This made the Act "an unconstitutional projection of New York law into conduct that occurs wholly outside New York." 1 48 Thus, the court concluded that "the Internet is one of those areas of commerce that must be marked off as a national preserve to protect users from inconsistent legislation that, taken to its most extreme, could paralyze development of the Internet altogether." 149 Some commentators have pointed to American Libraries Ass'n as proof that applying state law to Internet gambling would be unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and risks the Internet becoming "lost in a welter of inconsistent laws, imposed by different states with different priorities." 1 50 A related concern is the risk that a tiny, conservative jurisdiction could effectively mold the entire World Wide Web to fit its own moral contours. This threat materialized in 1995, when CompuServe temporarily blocked access worldwide to over 200 Munich, Germany, alleged that the sites contained sexual and other material that violated German law.1 5 ' Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has been considered in other Internet contexts, however, and held not to be an impediment to state action. In People v. Lipsitz, 152 for instance, the court analyzed and rejected the argument that dormant Commerce Clause concerns prevent the application of New York consumer protection law to an Internet magazine-subscription service operated from a server located in New York, the national nature of" the service notwithstanding. It noted that "consumer protection laws... were not designed nor aimed at regulating conduct outside this State's borders" ' 53 and that, unlike the statute at issue in American Libraries Ass'n, "these consumer protection statutes are not an attempt to regulate speech on the Internet or create an Internet regulatory scheme."
154 Thus, the court concluded, "the claims are of local concern, as recognized by the nationwide system of state consumer protection laws." 15 5 The Lipsitz court was correct that the system of individual state consumer protection laws that has developed since the 1960s never has been thought of as triggering dormant Commerce Clause problems, even when applied to national advertising campaigns.56 Moreover, these consumer protection laws have, in fact, been the weapon of choice for states that have challenged the legality of Internet gambling under state law.' 57 A problem lurks, however, at the remedy stage. Courts must be careful to craft a statespecific remedy that would not exclude gambling sites from jurisdictions that have not declared them illegal. 156. The problem of inconsistent or differing standards created by these laws, however, is hardly insignificant. For that reason, courts faced with certifying national class action cases brought under state consumer-protection laws often refuse to do so, because "variations in state laws" make the proposed class unmanageable. company from setting up accounts for, and taking bets from, Missouri residents,' 58 much in the same way that some sweepstakes refuse entries from residents of certain states.' 59 When Global Casino, in violation of the injunction, accepted such bets anyway, a criminal indictment was filed against the company's president."6
The advantage of the federal approach described earlier 6 ' is that, by accommodating each state's individual statutes, both dormant Commerce Clause problems and state policy disputes are avoided. Support for this proposition can be found in the circumstances that led to Pic-A-State.' 62 When Pennsylvania tried to stop Pic-A-State by passing a law that "prohibited the sale [in Pennsylvania] of any interest in another state's lottery," 63 a federal district court struck it down on dormant Commerce Clause grounds.'" 4 Congress then passed the Interstate Wagering Amendment, which prohibited the interstate transmission of lottery information. 65 This "made the Pennsylvania statute fully consistent with federal law and not unduly burdensome on interstate commerce."
66
C. Personal Jurisdiction and Due Process Concerns Can Be Satisfied
At first blush, ensuring that federal prosecutions of offshore Internet gambling operators comport with due process raises more complex issues than do other applications of long-arm jurisdiction. In fact, largely because of these jurisdictional problems, one student note has suggested that to try to apply existing gambling statutes to Internet gambling "would be like 165. See supra note 53; see also Pic-A-State Pa., Inc., 42 F.3d at 180 (reversing the district court's order declaring the statute unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement, on the ground that the Interstate Wagering Amendment had been enacted during the period between the district court's decision and the oral argument in the Third Circuit).
166. Pic-A-State Pa., 76 F.3d at 1297.
'performing brain surgery with stone tools." 1 6 7 Recent cases, however, have significantly clarified the analysis. One initial concern regarding personal jurisdiction and the Internet was whether the operator of an Internet site could, without suspecting it, be subject to prosecution in any jurisdiction from which the site could be accessed, raising the specter of potential jurisdiction worldwide. That is not the way the law has evolved, however, and properly so. Instead, employing the traditional two-pronged analysis, courts ask, first, whether there are sufficient contacts to ensure that in-state effects are sufficiently foreseeable for the site operator to have to defend a lawsuit there and, second, whether an assertion of jurisdiction is fair under due process. Moreover, in recent cases, courts have focused not just on whether an Internet transmission has occurred, but on the types of transmissions involved. In so doing, they have developed a continuum, whereby personal jurisdiction can be asserted over a Web site operation depending on the degree of interactivity the site allows or encourages with users in the forum state. 69 At one end of the continuum, courts generally do not find personal jurisdiction over purely passive Web sites that simply provide information to users. 7° In the middle are advertising sites that may list a toll-free number or otherwise more actively solicit business. These sites present close calls, and the decisions involving them are extremely fact-specific and go either 167 (dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction an action brought in Arizona against a company that had no contacts with the forum state other than maintaining "an essentially passive home page on the [Web," which was accessible by anyone and from anywhere, and holding there must be "'something more' to indicate that the defendant purposefully (albeit electronically) directed his activity in a substantial way to the forum state"); [Vol. 108:1569 way, sometimes depending on whether the Web sites constitute "passively informational, rather than solicitous advertisements." 7 1 At the far end of the spectrum are sites that interact with users and conduct business online.' 72 Courts have had little difficulty finding jurisdiction in these situations.
The best argument as to why Internet gambling operators should not be subject to personal jurisdiction in every venue from which their sites are accessed is a variation on an argument made by Professor Dan L. Burk: Because the Internet does not permit Web site operators to discriminate by jurisdiction, "its contacts with any given jurisdiction are less, rather than more purposeful." 173 Gambling site operators simply will contend that they cannot possibly know where individuals visiting their sites reside.
Whatever the merits of Burk's concerns in the abstract, they seem misplaced given the realities of Internet gambling. In virtually all cases in which actual bets have been accepted, ample facts will support the argument that the operators knew exactly where their customers lived and had sufficiently significant contacts to satisfy a purposeful availment analysis. Ark. 1997) (requiring that, to be subject to jurisdiction, Web site advertising be actively solicitous, thus preventing the chaotic conclusion "that a company is subject to personal jurisdiction at each and every location on the planet where someone is capable of logging on the Interet"); Inset Sys. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding a Web site that listed a toll-free number subject to jurisdiction because advertising via the Internet was solicitation of a sufficient repetitive nature).
172. in those cases at the beginning and middle of the continuum.' 76 It specifically noted that the defendant "continuously interacted with the casino players, entering into contracts with them... knowing it would receive commercial gain" from them, that Texas residents played those games "as if they were physically located in Texas," and that any winnings were ultimately to be delivered to Texas. 177 Moreover, it is difficult to argue that Internet casino and sports-betting sites that advertise both online and in national magazines, collect wagers from and transmit winnings to the United States, and post odds and scores on professional sporting events in the United States do not subject themselves to jurisdiction in every state where their patrons cut the virtual cards. There is a huge difference between the abstract, technological possibility that a site will be accessed from a given location-a prospect that, in and of itself, ordinarily should not trigger jurisdiction-and the undisputed fact that before any gambling occurs, an Internet gambling site will have taken many steps to make sure it gets money from the gamblers. 78
D. U.S. Criminal Law Reaches Offshore
Commentators' 79 and cybercasino operators" 8 ' have expressed concerns that American efforts to curb Internet gambling may interfere with the laws of other countries. They argue that most Internet gambling sites are properly licensed in countries such as Costa Rica and Antigua, where they support 176. Id. at 744. 177. Id. According to the court, the plaintiff "entered into a contract to play the game on Defendant's Web site," id. at 741, under which "the Defendant would send the winnings to the Plaintiff in Texas," id. at 744. But cf. Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that long-arm jurisdiction was properly exercised over defendants located in Nevada, who operated an Internet casino with a server in Belize, based on transmissions of information advertising the casino, even though no betting transactions occurred).
178. See infra notes 196-209 and accompanying text (detailing the contacts of Interet gambling sites with their customers' jurisdictions in the Southern District of New York complaints). In addition to jurisdictional due process concerns, there also is the due process issue of whether, prior to the first Internet gambling prosecutions, Internet gambling operators had fair notice that their operations were condemned by § 1084. Given the breadth of § 1084, its prior application to the offshore, telephone-based equivalents of Internet gambling, the legislative history indicating its applicability to all forms of gambling operations relying on "wire communications facilities," and the number of articles noting the possibility of prosecutions under § 1084, it is difficult to argue they did not. These non-Internet contacts with the United States do not appear to be either incidental or avoidable. Although in the future it may be possible to do business with U.S. customers from Antigua without using U.S. banks, U.S. mails, U.S. publications, U.S. telephones, and U.S. addresses, that day is not here. As long as Internet gambling sites have to attract American customers, who account for over fifty percent of Internet use, 210 these contacts are inevitable, and they inevitably provide both a substantive basis for federal prosecution and an ample foundation for the assertion of jurisdiction over criminal defendants.
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Gambling in Cyberspace
E. Antigambling Statutes Can Be Applied to Cyberspace as Readily as Other Laws
Arguments that the Internet requires a different legal regime rely on the assumption that its unique characteristics will make it difficult, if not impossible, for courts to apply existing laws sensibly in the digital era.
211
That assumption is seriously overstated. Rather than accepting it uncritically, the inquiry should be whether there is anything unique about the use of the Internet for gambling that should inhibit its prosecution under current law in jurisdictions where other, non-digital gambling is illegal.
The more the mechanics of Internet gambling are reviewed, 21 2 the more it appears to be a new-media imitation of what federal law has long condemned when practiced via other communications media, such as the telephone and fax. 213 This renders gambling quite amenable to the traditional kind of media-neutral approach used in intellectual property law. Media-neutral application of law is familiar in copyright, for instance, largely because of the extraordinary effort made to ensure that the Copyright Act of 1976 would work well in the digital age. For that reason, the "subject matter of copyright" is defined as "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 214 The media-neutrality of copyright law is further reflected in its legislative history: "Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but it is impossible to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will take. ' 215 The following characterization of the nation's copyright laws therefore remains apt in the information age:
[Y]ou can read the bill from beginning to end and you won't find in it any reference to computers, for example. Yet these are one of the coming instruments of communication in the future. We have tried to phrase the broad rights granted in such a way that they can be adapted as time goes on to each of the new advancing media. 2 " 6 A recent decision illustrates the importance of the media-neutrality of the Copyright Act. In 1993, a coalition of freelance writers sued the New York Times and other major publications for including their contributions in the electronic editions of periodicals made available on the Lexis-Nexis electronic research database and in CD-ROM format. In Tasini v. New York Times," 1 7 the court ruled in favor of the publications, finding that the electronic versions of the periodicals in dispute fell within the "any revision" language of section 201(c) of the Copyright Act, which grants publishers the "right to revise their collective works," including transforming them into digital versions. 2 18 The court noted the lengths to which Congress went to study the impact of computers on copyright 2 19 to ensure that it had drafted a media-neutral statute. It concluded that "it is to be presumed that the terms of the 1976 Act encompass all variety of developing technologies." 2 20
Even without such specific guidance from Congress, courts have applied the Copyright Act in a media-neutral way. For example, in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, 22 ' Netcom, an Internet service provider, was accused of infringing copyrights in Scientology tracts by providing Internet access to a computer bulletin board service on which portions of those works were stored. 2 ' The court rejected the argument that such storage made Netcom directly liable for copyright infringement. Instead, it analogized Netcom to "the owner of a copying machine who lets the public make copies with it" 223 and held that direct infringement requires "some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant's system is merely used to create a copy by a third party." '224 By refusing to construe the Act so literally, the court refrained from penalizing Internet users and operators who had done no [Vol. 108: 1569 more than "implement a system that is essential if Usenet messages are to be widely distributed." 2 The media-neutral application of old laws to Internet activities is no more difficult in the criminal context. In People v. Lipsitz, 22 6 the court held that a magazine subscription scheme that aggressively marketed to members of "listservs" 227 but did not deliver the subscriptions as promised could be prosecuted for fraud. Responding to its own inquiry as to whether there were Internet-related reasons why such a scheme should not be prosecuted in New York, the court placed the question in a "realistic context... leav[ing] behind the rarified air of cyberspace" and concluded:
There is no compelling reason to find that local legal officials must take a "hands off" approach just because a crook or a con artist is technologically sophisticated enough to sell on the Internet. Invocation of "the Internet" is not the equivalent to a cry of "sanctuary" upon a criminal's entry into a medieval church. It should be sufficient that the laws sought to be applied.., are "media neutral" and otherwise pass constitutional muster. 22 The Justice Department struck a similar note in explaining its decision to prosecute Internet gambling under the Wire Wager Act, maintaining that § 1084 applies equally to the Internet as to any "wire communication facility" that was in existence when the Act was passed. In fact, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, in announcing the arrests and complaints, used language strikingly similar to the Lipsitz opinion:
The Internet is not an electronic sanctuary for illegal betting. If a state outlaws soliciting or accepting bets, you can't evade those requirements by going on-line. It's a federal crime to use the Internet to conduct betting operations. And to Internet betting operators everywhere we have a simple message; You can't hide on-line and you can't hide off-shore. 229 Some commentators disagree with Attorney General Reno's assertion, however, suggesting that the ability of Internet gambling operators to hide, both on-line and off-shore, makes enforcement impossible and, therefore,
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The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108:1569 makes any legislation in this area an empty gesture.3 0 By disguising their on-line identities, they argue, gambling operators may escape detection and identification altogether; by moving themselves and their assets from account to account and country to country, they may make such assets untraceable and unattachable; by remaining permanently offshore, they may, short of kidnapping or extradition, escape U.S. law entirely.
There are two problems with these arguments. First, thus far, it is impossible even to register a domain name or establish a Web site anonymously, if only because registration services require reliable billing information. 3 " Web site operators necessarily leave footprints, ultimately making them vulnerable to the same investigative techniques that law enforcement has traditionally used-including sting operations and sham accounts opened by undercover operatives.3 2 Second, investigative techniques do not appear to have lagged behind in cyberspace. As early as 1995, FBI and state authorities cooperated in a sting operation on the Internet, whereby agents posing as minors developed enough incriminating evidence to arrest a dozen online child pornographers. 3 Additionally, the SEC, FTC, and state attorneys general offices have long been active in monitoring and investigating Internet fraud schemes. 4 There is every reason to expect that, just as Internet gambling operators grow more sophisticated, so too will law enforcement's ability to reach them, uncover their true identities and assess their contacts with U.S. This Essay has set forth two reasons why it is wrong to contend that Internet gambling facilitated by Web sites based offshore cannot be prosecuted under existing federal law. 6 First, such arguments fail to appreciate the long history of successful federal prosecution of gambling operations conducted by earlier long distance communication methods 7 Second, and more significantly, they fail to recognize that Internet gambling sites use the Internet only as an instrument to commit a very traditional crime. In other words, nothing about the Internet makes illegal gambling any different from gambling carried on and successfully prosecuted via the mail, a telegraph, a telephone, or a fax machine. z 8 Therefore, this Essay has characterized Internet gambling as a media-neutral offenseY 9 Other laws, both civil and criminal, are similarly media-neutral and can be applied to Internet activity without the need for new models or legal regimes. 24 In the criminal context, as long as the Internet is not the object or
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108:1569 subject of the crime 24 but is instead the instrument by which an otherwise criminal act is committed, it is difficult to comprehend why any new legal regime is necessary.
United States v. Thomas 42 demonstrates how traditional law can be applied in a media-neutral way to crimes facilitated via the Internet. In Thomas, two defendants, both California residents, were convicted in Tennessee for transmitting to Tennessee obscene material via their bulletin board service. A postal inspector in Memphis, Tennessee, joined that service under an assumed name; he subsequently received images over interstate telephone lines and by mail that depicted a wide variety of sexual conduct, including bestiality and excretory fetishism. A jury determined that the materials were obscene under Memphis's "contemporary community standards." 243 The Thomases' convictions were upheld by the Sixth Circuit. The panel rejected the argument that the Thomases should have been judged by the community standards of California rather than Tennessee, citing evidence that the Thomases, knowing the undercover postal inspector was located in Memphis, nonetheless made a conscious decision to permit him to subscribe to their service.
The application of Tennessee's community standards to an obscenity prosecution of California residents has been criticized on several grounds. 2 ' Whatever the ultimate wisdom of the result in Thomas, which the Sixth Circuit took care to depict as fact specific, 245 the case further illustrates the 241. See Dillon et al., supra note 238, at 507 (arguing that the computer is the "object" of a crime when the offender targets the computer itself, as in theft of computer processor time or computerized services, the "subject" of a crime when it is the site of, source of, or reason for, "unique forms of asset loss," as in the distribution of viruses, or an "instrument" used to commit traditional crimes).
242 VA. L. REV. 535, 536 (1996) (suggesting that, in addition to First Amendment concerns, the Commerce Clause presents "serious difficulties" for locality-based regulation of computer bulletin board systems).
245. The Sixth Circuit was able to distinguish, on the facts before it, the Thomases' conduct from "a situation where the bulletin board operator had no knowledge or control over the jurisdiction where materials were distributed for downloading .... Defendants had in place methods to limit user access in jurisdictions where the risk of finding of obscenity was greater .... They knew they had a member in Memphis." Thomas, 74 F.3d at 711. The Thomas court also pointed out that the Supreme Court, in Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1989) , "found no constitutional impediment" in requiring distributors of adult content to tailor their materials to the standards of a particular community. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 712. media-neutrality of laws of general application. The knowing transmission of sexual content from California to Tennessee via the Internet is no different from sending it by mail. The same is true of Internet gambling: Although setting up a casino or bookmaking operation in cyberspace requires more sophistication than running a sports-betting operation by telephone or mail, the underlying crimes are identical, whatever the medium.
There are, undoubtedly, Internet-specific crimes that can be attacked only in a media-specific manner. When a computer system is itself the subject or object of a crime, the offense is subject to media-specific laws. 246 For example, a crime such as hacking into a credit card computer system and using the information to obtain fraudulent credit cards is punishable, not by media neutral laws, but by specific federal statutes that cover computer crimes. 247 The same laws thwarted a scheme by a hacker named Eugene Kashpureff to divert Internet traffic that was intended for InterNICregistered Web sites (domain names ending in ".com," ".net," ".org," etc.) to his own "AlterNIC" domains (".sex" and ".web"). 2 ' Concerning Internet gambling, however, as Professor Hardy notes in a different context, " [t] here is nothing about the connection medium itself that matters here or that differs from other communication means." ' 249 Indeed, given the broad language of § 1084, which prohibits the use of any wired or similarly connected communications service from being used for gambling, one can argue that the Wire Wager Act was drafted to ensure that the precise nature of the wiring used is irrelevant. This Essay concludes, therefore, that there is no reason why courts should not apply § 1084 to enforce federal gambling policy on the Internet.
